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THE "JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITYt
FORREST R.

BLACK

II

The discussion thus far has considered the historical clash for supremacy
between administrative and judicial bodies and the growth of administrative
autonomy. In order that a clear picture of the modern application of the
jurisdictional fact theory might be presented, there has been a critique of
Crowell v. Benson. And finally, the distinction between the judicial and
administrative concept of "jurisdiction" has been set forth in connection with
the consideration of legislative and administrative efforts in England and
America to immunize administrative bodies from judicial review.
Our discussion thus far leads us to the conclusion that the courts exercise a
wide and at times an almost unpredictable jural freedom in reviewing administrative action. Although the case material to date cannot be reduced to a logical
system, 29 it remains to consider three additional factors which condition the
tThis study was made possible by a Social Science Research Council Grant-in-Aid.
The first installment of this article appeared in (1937) 22 Coiu'zLu L. Q. 349.
'Alpert, Suits Against Administrative Agencies (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. at 433,
434, states in summary fashion the major principles of judicial review of administrative
action as follows: (1) Findings of fact are conclusive if supported by the evidence.
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462, 471 (S. D. W. Va. 1928) ; Tollefson,
Administrative Finality (1931) 29 Mica. L. Rav. 839, 840. (2) The legal effect of
evidence is a question of law for the court as are all questions of law. Marion & Rye
Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280, 285 (1926). (3) The court will review
to determine whether the commission exceeded its statutory powers. So. Pac. Co. v. I.-C.
C., 219 U. S. 433, 442 et seq. (1911) ; United States v. N. Y. R. Co., 263 U. S. 603
(1924) ; United Siates v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533, 540 (1924) ; Western Paper
Makers Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268, 271 (1924) ; Assigned Car Cases, 274
U. S. 564 (1927) ; Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462, 471 (S. D. W. Va.
1928) ; Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 789, 793 (W. D. Mo.
1929), aff'd, 282 U. S. 74 (1930) ; Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 57 F.
(2d) 735, 739 (D. Colo. 1932). (4) The court will review to determine whether the
statute under which the commission operates is constitutional. Dickinson, Crowell v.
Benson: JudicialReview of Administrative Determinationsof Questions of "Constitutional
Fact" (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1055. (5) The court will review to determine
whether the "juirsdictional facts" existed which give the commission power to hear and
decide the controversy. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, at 54 et seq. (1932) ; Comment
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv.
1055, 1059 if. (6) The court is reluctant to interfere where the problem is one of discretion. Tollefson, supra, at 841. (7) The courts allow less review where a question of
privilege is involved. Tollefson, supra, at 842. (8) As to mixed questions of law and
fact, the courts adhere to the rule that where the court cannot separate the questions, the
decision of the tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is conclusive. Tollefson,
supra, at 843; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1921) 35
HARv. L. REv. 149-151. (9.) Opportunities for, or the lack of, judicial review depend
largely upon the adequacy of the process, including the right of appeal that is provided
within the administrative tribunal. Tollefson, supra, at 844.
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application of the jurisdictional fact theory and whose presence and influence
either singly or in combination, will at least warrant a prediction as to the general judicial trend. Those factors are (1) the type of governmental power involved (public lands, post office, control of aliens, taxation, regulation, etc.) ;
(2) the form of action employed by the plaintiff (certiorari, mandamus,
injunction, etc.); and (3) the type of administrative finding, (a) summary,
(b) after hearing with procedural safeguards, or (c) complicated investigation based upon expert appraisal.
In attempting to show the influence of these three factors, the enormity
of the case material precludes exhaustive study of each. 30 Rather the
purpose shall be to present in outline form the chief principles involved, as
illustrated by a few selected leading decisions. Inasmuch as two or more of
these factors are usually present in a case, a separate treatment of each
factor would not only be artificial but also misleading as to the holding
of the court. Consequently, for convenience I shall use as my outline the
type of governmental power involved, and in discussing the leading cases
in each group I shall emphasize, wherever the court has done so, the two other
factors.' 81
Public Land Cases
Here the power-renouncing attitude of the courts has found its fullest
expression. Various reasons have been assigned for this attitude. 32 (a) Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of titles emanating
from the United Statesj 33 In Gibson v. Chouteau,'3 the Court declared
that "with respect to the public domain, the Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 3,
Cl. 2) vests in Congress the power of disposition and of making all needful
rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations." (b) Since
35
Congress "has constituted the Land Department as a special tribual,"I
it is to be expected that the courts would evidence a strong reluctance to
review decisions of the Land Office. (c) It has also been suggested that the
power to dispose of and survey public lands belongs exclusively "to the
'"Several Treatises have been written. THE FEDERAL TRADE COmIlSSlON by McFARLAND (1933); BLAISDELL (1932); HARLAND AND MCCANDLESS (1916); BUTLER AND
LYNDE (1915); HENDERSON (1924); HOLDT (1922). See also THE INTERSTATE COMsMERCE COMMISSION by SHARFMAN (1931) and BERNHARDT (1923); Van Vleck, ADmINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932). See the list of unpublished doctors' dissertations in the Harvard Law School Library.
mDickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in HARvARD STUDIES
IN ADMINISTRATI

LAW (1927), must have the credit of pioneering in the analysis

of this intricate problem.

His work stands today as the most authoritative discussion.

"'For general treatment see McClintock, The -AdministrativeDetermination of Public
Land Controversies (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rzv. 420, 542, 638; also WHITE, THE ADmINIsTRATION OF THE LAND OFFICE (unpublished doctor's monograph in Widener Library,

Harvard, 1911); THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE (U. S. Service Monograph, No. 13, Institute of Government Research, 1923).

'Bagnell v. Broderick 13 Peters 450 (U. S. 1839).
'13 Wall. 99 (U. S. 1871).
5
'U. S. ex tel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 317 (1903).
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political department of the government and the action of that department
within the scope of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by a direct proceeding."' 36 (d) Further, Congress has never specifically provided for
review by the courts of the Land Department, although there has been some
demand for such review, at one time supported by President Taft. 37 (e) In
disposing of public lands to private individuals, the government is in effect
dispensing a bounty, and while the distribution must be made in accordance
with statutory requirements, the would-be beneficiary has no standing to
138
object to a fairly wide latitude of discretion on the part of the land officials.
Insofar as the decision affects the relation of the applicant and the government, the final determination of the rights of the applicant by the government
may be made a condition precedent to the disposition of the government's property.139 This principle is sometimes stated to be that "the acts of the Land
Department are discretionary until the right to the land has become vested
in the applicant."' 40 (f) Often the courts insist that these special tribunals act
"judicially" and that, therefore, "their judgment as to matters of fact properly
determinable by them is conclusive when brought to notice in a collateral
proceeding. Their judgment in such cases is like that of other special
tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, unassailable except
by a direct proceeding for its correction or annulment. 'u 41 In the Kemp
case, the Court went further and declared:
"If in issuing a patent its officers took mistaken views of the law,
or drew erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or even from corrupt motives, a court of
law can afford no remedy to a party alleging that he is thereby aggrieved.
He must resort to a court of equity for relief; and even there his complaint cannot be heard unless he connect himself with the original source
of the title, so as to be able to aver that his rights are injuriously affected
by the existence of the patent; and must possess
such equities as will
42
control the legal title in the patentee's hands."'
(g) At other times the Court insists that the function of the Land Office as
a special tribunal
"is not judicial; it is administrative, executive and political in nature,
The abstract right to interfere in such cases has been uniformly denied
by judicial tribunals, as breaking down the distinction so important and
'"Knight v. United Land Association, 142 U. S. 161 (1891).

'See Finney, The Board of Appeals, Department of the Interior (1916) 10 Am. POL.
ScI. REv. 290, 292.
'See DIcKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927)
p. 277.
'See
McCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 132, p. 650.
"'0Noble v. Union River Logging Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893); Lane v. Watts, 234
U. S.525 (1914).
'St.
Louis Smelting and Refining Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 (1881).
12
l bid p. 647.
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well defined in our system between
the several, separate and independent
1 43

branches of our government."'

(h) While a patent may be attacked directly by the government in a proceed144
or mistake, 145
ing in equity to set it aside because secured through fraud
it should be noted that the court will exercise this jurisdiction with extreme
caution and the relief will be refused unless the fraud is proved not merely
by a preponderance of the evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt.' 46
In subsequent suits in equity to determine the title to what was originally
public land, the courts accept the findings of the Department on controverted questions of fact.' 47 In one case, the Court apparently held that the
decision of the Land Department could be set aside for fraud consisting
only of perjury in the proofs submitted. 148 But in later cases the courts have
declined to grant relief for perjury at ffhe hearings, the consideration of
which would require a retrial of the issues 149 and have followed the rule that
the fraud must be more than false testimony at the hearing.'5 0 (i) Expediency
of litigation has also been advanced to justify the power-renouncing attitude
of the courts in public land cases. In St. Louis Smelting and Refining Company v. Kemp,' 5 ' the Court said:
"The patent of the United States is the conveyance by which the
nation passes title to portions of the public domain. Such a patent is
conclusive in an action at law as to the legal title . . . otherwise instead

of being a means of peace and security, it would subject his [the
patentee's] rights to constant and ruinous litigation."
(j) In determining questions of law on which the Department has previously passed, the courts in the public land cases give special force to the rule that
the construction of a statute by the executive department which is entrusted
with its enforcement is entitled to great weight. 152 In a leading public land
case, the Court declared that "a continuous administrative construction, unless clearly erroneous will not be upset by mandamus, even though in its
absence the courts might be disposed to construe the statute differently."' 53
In Heath v. Wallace,'5 the Supreme Court followed a departmental con','owns v. Hubbard, 123 U. S. 189 (1887).
'"Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514 (1890).
"'Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U. S. 514 (1896).
'Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 380, 381 (1886).
"'Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U. S. 463 (1882); Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 38 (1885);
United States v. Atldns, 260 U. S. 220 (1922).
"'Minnesota v. Bachelder, 1 Wall. 109 (U. S. 1863).
"'United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878); Steel v. St. Louis Smelting
and Refining Co., 106 U. S. 447 (1882).
1"32 Cyc. 1052 and cases cited r. 15.
'104 U. S. 636 (1882).
'Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 475 (1900); Barriard's Heirs v. Ashley's Heirs, 18
How. 43, 45 (U. S. 1885).
'United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 688 (1912). See also Logen v.
Davis, 233 U. S. 613 (1913).
g138 U. S. 573 (1890).
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struction which went directly to the jurisdiction of the Department. The
question presented was whether land marked on the official plat as "subject to periodic overflow" was to be interpreted as "Swamp and overflowed" within the meaning of the Swamp Land Act. If this interpretation were adopted, title would have passed directly to the state government
at the date of the act, and the jurisdiction of the Land Department would
have been ousted. The Land Office had ruled that such land was not
within the terms of the act, and the Supreme Court sustained the Land
Office's position on the following grounds: (1) The administrative construction of a statute ought not to be overruled except upon the most cogent
reasons; (2) the question was "one of the definitiom of words or terms
rather than of the interpretationof the statute"; and (3) therefore the question was one of fact and not of law. (k) Finally, the leading case of United
States ex rel. Riverside Oil Company v. Hitchcockh5 5 illustrates the obstacle
of technical limitations on the procedure available for relief. The Court
held that "neither injunction nor a mandamus will lie against an officer of
the Land Department to control him in discharging an official duty which
requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion." It should be noted
that in this case the Court refused to review even a construction of the
statute by the land officials. The Court declared:
"Whether he decided right or wrong is not the question. Having
jurisdiction to decide at all, he had necessarily jurisdiction, and it was
his duty to decide as he thought the law was, and the courts have no
power whatever under those circumstances to review his determination
by mandamus or injunction. The writ of mandamus never can be used
as a substitute for a writ of error. Nor does the fact that no writ of
error will lie in such a case as this, by which to review the judgment of
the Secretary, furnish any foundation for the claim that mandamus
may therefore be awarded. Their responsibility as well as the power
rests with the Secretary uncontrolled by the courts."
Pension Cases
From the standpoint of judicial review of administrative action, the pension
cases have a history very similar to the public land cases. The courts have
stressed the fact that pensions are bounties of the government which Con56
gress has the right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall at its discretion.
No pensioner has a vested legal right to his pension ;'57 therefore, when a
Federal Pension Board has denied a claimant the right to a pension, it is
the general rule that the federal courts have no power to review the
decision.358 Following the decisions in the Land Cases, courts have held that
=190 U. S. 317 (1903).
2Walton v. Cotton, 19 Howard 355 (U. S. 1856).
'United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888) 44 STAT. 882 (1926), 38 U. S. C. A.
620 (1927) provides that the decisions of the pension officials shall be final and
conclusive.
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the United States cannot recover monies paid out as pensions because
procured by fraud, where the fraud is proved merely by a preponderance of
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.159 In one of the leading
pension cases, 160 there is an excellent discussion of the manner in which the
type of action sought by the plaintiff effects the court in its review of administrative action. This decision analyzes two of the leading mpandamus
161
and Decatur v. Paulding.162
cases, Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes
In the Kewndal case the mandamus was granted. Stockton and Stokes, as
contractors for carrying the mails, had certain claims against the government
for extra services which they insisted should be credited to their accounts,
and a controversy arose between them and the post-office department. Congress passed an act for their relief by which the Solicitor of the Treasury was
authorized to settle and adjust their claims and to allow them such credit
as upon a full examination of 'all the evidence might seem to be equitable and
just. The Solicitor, after due investigation, made his report and stated
therein the sums due to Stockton and Stokes on the claims made by them;
but the Postmaster General, Mr. Kendall, refused to give them credit as
directed. The Court held that he could be compelled to do so by mandamus
since there was simply a ministerial duty to be performed and not an official
act requiring any exercise of judgment or discretion. The Court said:
"He [the Postmaster General] was not called upon to furnish the
means of paying such balance, if any should be found. He was simply
required to give them credit. This was not an official act in any other sense
than being a transaction in the department where the books and accounts
were kept; and was an official act in the same sense that an entry in the
minutes of a court, pursuant to an order of the court, is an official
act. There is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or
otherwise; all that is shut out by the direct and positive command of the
law, and the act required to be done is, in every just sense, a mere
ministerial act."
In the Decatur case the mandamus was refused. There, Congress had
passed a general act providing pensions for the widows of naval officers
who had died in the service. A special resolution was also passed at the
same time granting a pension to the widow of Commodore Stephen Decatur.
The Secretary of the Navy ruled that she might make her election to
receive either pension, but was not entitled to both. Mrs. Decatur applied
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to make payments to her
under both the Act and the resolution. The case obviously turned upon the
interpretation of the resolution granting the special pension, and whether
or not it was intended to increase the amount of the pension payable under
'Lalone
v. United States, 164 U. S. 255 (1896).
16
" United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888).
112 Peters 524 (U. S. 1838).
'14 Peters 497 (U. S. 1840).

"JURISDICTIONAL FACT" THEORY
the general act. But the Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction of
this question, and, speaking through Chief Justice Taney, said:
"The duty required by the resolution was to be performed by the
Secretary of the Navy as the head of one of the executive departments
of the government in the ordinary discharge of his official duties. The
head, of an executive department in the administration of the various
important concerns of his office must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under which he is from time
to time required to act. If he doubts, he has a right to call on the
Attorney-General to assist him with his counsel and it would be difficult
to imagine why a legal adviser was provided by law for the heads of
departments unless their duties were regarded as executive in which
judgment and discretion were to be exercised. If a suit should come
before this court which involved the construction of any of these laws,
the court certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given
by a head of a department and if they supposed his decision to be wrong
they would of course so pronounce their judgment. But their judgment
upon the construction of a law must be given in a case in which it is
their duty to interpret the act of Congress in order to ascertain the
rights of the parties in the case before them. The court could not
entertain an appeal from the decision of one of the secretaries nor revise
his judgment in any case where the law authorized him to exercise discretion and judgment."
Professor Ernst Freund has pointed out that in pension and public land
cases involving a government bounty, the Court is justified in assuming that
Congress intended minor points of legal construction in the application of
federal statutes to be determined by administrative officers and not to
be controlled by the courts through mandamus.'
"This accounts in a very simple manner for a number of cases in
which it has been held that mandamus does not reach the 'executive'
function of interpreting a statute. If this however were generalized into
a rule that the construction of a statute is not a ministerial act, and therefore uncontrollable by mandamus,'0 4 the value of the writ, as the Supreme
Court has observed, would be yery greatly impaired, since every official
duty to some extent requires statutory construction, and the result would

165
It would
be a most unfortunate limitation of the powers of the court.

also run counter to the principle that, barring very exceptional cases,
questions of law are always subject to judicial re-examination."' 6
The Relation of Public Officials Inter Se and to the Government
In this field, the courts have always been reluctant to review administrative
findings, and the leading decisions indicate special reasons for this attitude,
reasons not advanced in the public land and pension cases. (1) An official hierS. 316 (1912); Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683
497 (U. S.1840).
Conn. 448, 22 Ad. 494 (1888).
221, 231 (1900).
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY p. 257.

"1United States v. Hitchcock, 190 U.
(1911) ; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters
'0'American Casualty Co. v. Fyler, 60
"'Robers v. United States, 176 U. S.
4

'l ADMINISTRATIVE
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archy constitutes one big family; and the proper relation of superior to inferior, which tends to promote operating efficiency, often precludes the right to an
appeal over the heads of superiors to a court of law. In the leading case of
Murray v. Hoboken Land Company,' 6 7 the Court upheld as within due
process of law a summary method of proceeding by distress warrant against
a delinquent tax collector. In its decision, the Court recognized the distinction "between public defaulters and ordinary debtors." The Court, after
observing that Congress could not withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its very nature, is a subject of suit at common law, in
equity, or in admiralty, said:
"At the same time there are matters involving public rights which may
be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper."
(2) The concept of discipline runs throughout the public officer cases but
finds its most compelling application against judicial interference when the
68
rights of persons who enlist or are drafted in the military and naval service
are involved. The autonomy of the military and naval establishments is
generally recognized, and the rights of their members to life and liberty are
often determined by military court martial. 6 9 (3) Further, an appointment to
public office is not a contract, and vested interests are not at stake.170 In the
absence of some specific constitutional limitation, the legislature may terminate
the official relation by abolishing the office, shortening the term, declaring
the office to be vacant, or transferring the duties of one office to another."'
(4) The appointment to an official position in the government, even to a clerical position, is not a mere ministerial act, but one involving the exercise of
discretion. In the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, the power
of removal from office is incident to the power of appointment. (5) In Keim
v. United States, 7 the Court declared:
"if courts should not be called upon to supervise the results of a civil
service examination (a duty which is, at least, more administrative than
judicial) equally inappropriate would be an investigation into the actual
work done by the various clerks, a comparison of one with another as
-18 Howard 272 (U. S. 1856).
1Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99 (1890) ; Blake v. U. S., 103 U. S. 227
(1880) ; Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296 (1911).
r'In re Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879) ; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167 (1886) ; Johnson
v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109 (1895).
27'Butler v. Pennslyvania, 10 Howard 402 (U. S. 1850); United States v. Fisher,
109 U. S. 143 (1883) ; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99 (1890). See GOODNOW,
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1905)
p. 286.
inState v. Douglas, 26 Wis. 428 (1870) ; Bunting v. Gales, 77 N. C. 283 (1877) ; Attorney General v. Squires, 14 Cal. 12 (1859); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 Howard 402
(U. S. 1850). See GOODNOW, op. cit. supra note 170, p. 315.
1177 U. S.290 (1900).
1
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to competency, attention to duty, etc. These are matters peculiarly
within the province of those who are in charge of and superintending
the departments, and until Congress by some special and direct legislation makes provision to the contrary, we are clear that they must be
settled by those administrative officers."
(6) The courts generally have adoped a laisses faire attitude in cases involving the power of removal from public office. An appointment for a
four-year term has been considered as a term of four years subject to prior
removal. 78a Where a statute provided for removal "for causes prescribed
by law" and no causes were affirmatively specified by statute, the power of
174
Where a statute provided for three
removal was held to be absolute.
grounds of removal, the Supreme Court has held that the enumeration of
75
Where
these specific grounds did not preclude removal on other grounds.
the statute requires an opportunity for notice and hearing before removal,
if these procedural requirements have been met, the courts will not go behind
a determination ordering a removal. 17 6 (7) It is interesting to note that as an
77
aftermath of the famous case of Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
referred to above, a suit for damages was instituted seven years later by
Stokes against the Postmaster General. In the later case, Kendall v.
Stokes, 7 8 is found dicta by the Court inconsistent with the former holding.
In the first case, a mandamus was granted on the theory that the Postmaster
General, in crediting the amount which the Solicitor determined to be due to
Stokes, was performing a mere ministerial act. In the later case, the Court
by way of dictum referred to the identical act as "not merely a ministerial
one, but.., one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and
discretion." (8) The prevailing view of the courts concerning the relation of
public officers inter se and to the government is well expressed in the leading case of Keim v. United States, 79 in which the Court quoted with approval from an earlier opinion as follows:
"It has been repeatedly adjudged that the courts have no general supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the various administrative departments of the government ...

the interference of the courts

with the performance of the ordinary duties of the excutive departments would be productive of nothing but mischief and we are quite
satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given to them."
Administrative Control over Aliens
An authority in this field has declared that:
"We have devised a system of administrative procedure of executive
v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897).
'"Parsons
7
S. 419 (1901).
'Reagan v. United States, 182 U.
lShurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S.311 (1903).
-"Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392 (1884). In re Guden, 171 N. Y. 529 (1902);
People v. Brady, 166 N. Y. 44 (1901).
1712 Peters 524 (U. S.1838).
1783

Howard 7 (U. S. 1845).

17177 U. S.290 (1899).
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justice, with a maximum of powers in the administrative officers, a
minimum of checks and safeguards against error and prejudice, and
with certainty, care and due deliberation sacrificed to the desire for
speed."18o
Even with our restricted immigration policy during the calendar year
ending June 30, 1930, 446,214 immigrants were admitted and 8,233 were
rejected. The very fact that more than one thousand immigrants are arriving
each day is an eloquent reminder of the necessity for summary administrative
action. The Immigration Act sets up boards of special inquiry for exclusion
cases but does not do so for deportation cases.' s - Further, the act provides
that the decisions of these administrative boards shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of Labor. The administrative body is also
8 2
given considerable leeway in regulating its own procedural conduct.'
The courts, in permitting administrative officers to exercise a free hand
in this field have emphasized the right of the United States to control
the admission of aliens as "inherent in sovereignty and essential to self
preservation11 s83 Other nations have placed that control finally in the hands
of administrative officers. The English courts have justified the final refusal
of executive officials to admit an alien as coming within the doctrine of
"acts of state.' 8 4 In Buron v. Dennan,'8 5 an English court took the position
that if the defendant could show that the question at issue was properly a
"matter of state," the court would give judgment in his favor without going
into the merits. 8 6 This power cannot be restricted even by treaty. In the
Chinese Exclusion Case, 87 the Court said:
"Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous
laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by
its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable
only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act,
are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground
for complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the
subject."
A summary administrative power over immigrants was upheld in Oceanic
Steamship Company v. Stranahan.8 8 The Immigration Act provided that
'°VAN VLECK, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) p. 224.
18139 STAT. 889 (1917), (U. S. C. A.) ; Soo Hoo Yee v. United States,

F. (2d) 592
(C. C. A. 2d 1924).
'Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Commissions (1922) 17 ILL. L. REv. 263,
265, 272, 282.
'United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S.279 (1904).
'Musgrove v. Toy, (1891) A. C. 272.
2m2
Ex. 167 (1848).
18
"Acts of State" is the English doctrine that is similar in many respects to the
American doctrine of "political questions." See W. HARRisoN MooRE, Acr OF STATE
IN ENGLISH LAW (1906).
'81Sub. Nom. Chao Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S.581 (1889).
18214 U. S.320 (1909).
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when the Secretary of Labor found that an alien was afflicted with a loathsome or contagious disease at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the
existence.of the disease might have been detected at that time, the owner
or consignee of the vessel should pay a specified penalty and no vessel should
be granted clearance papers while the fine so imposed remained unpaid.
Professor Ernst Freund has said:
"This provision is extraordinary as permitting the imposition of a
penalty by administrative act, contrary to American constitutional usage,
the withholding of clearance being merely a means of enforcing the
penalty."' 8 9
The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the provision* as an
expression of the broad power of Congress over foreign commerce and -made
a distinction between criminal punishment and the imposition of a penalty.
It is the general rule that an administrative decision will not be reversed
because the court believes it to be erroneous, 90 unless it is so clearly incorrect that it could not reasonably have been reached.191 However, the entrant is entitled to a fair hearing 92 and may raise that issue in the courts
through a writ of habeas corpus. 193 But even in those cases wherein the
court may intervene ultimately by habeas corpus, it should be noted that before he is entitled to judicial relief, the burden is on the petitioner to show
that he has completely exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by
statute. Mr. Justice Holmes has said:
"If the allegations of a petition for habeas corpus setting up want of
jurisdiction . . . are true, the petitioner theoretically is entitled to his
liberty at once. Yet a summary interruption of the regular order of
proceedings by means of the writ is not always a matter of right."' 94
In the famous case of United States v. .u Toy, 95 characterized by an English commentator as "the origin of American Administrative Law,"' 96 we
find the most conspicuous instance in which an administrative finding of a
jurisdictional fact was held conclusive by the courts. The petitioner, having
exhausted his administrative remedies, brought his case before the Supreme
Court of the United States upon a certificate from the court below on the
question of whether the court should treat the finding of fact by the
administrative officers as final and conclusive "unless it be made affirmatively
to appear that such officers in the case submitted to them, abused the discretion vested in them, or in some other way, in hearing and determining the
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY p. 199.
"Dharandas Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U. S. 258 (1923).
"Lisotta v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 5th 1924).
-"'Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908).
'United States ex rel. Karamian v. Curran, 16 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 2d 1927).
'United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
u5198 U. S. 253 (1908).
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same, committed prejudicial error." This was an exclusion case and Ju Toy
claimed to have been born of Chinese parents in the United States. Hence
the administrative finding was as to a pure "question of fact"-where Ju Toy
was born. There was no dispute as to his Chinese parentage. It should be
noted that the immigration statutes apply in terms to aliens only; hence
the issue of citizenship or alienage is a jurisdictional fact. The Court held
that the administrative decision as to the status of the petitioner, no abuse
of authority being shown, was to be regarded as final and conclusive and
1 97
in conformity with due process of law.
The courts have held that the Ju Toy doctrine does not apply in the
two following types of cases. (a) If the question of alienage depends
upon a "matter of law." This question is always one for the court, and
judicial relief will be granted even before recourse is had to the administrative remedies offered.'9 8 In the Gonzales case the Court considered
whether or not a native of Puerto Rico, who was an inhabitant of that
island at the time of its cession to the United States, was upon her arrival
at a port of this country to be treated as an alien immigrant within the
meaning of the Act of Congress of 1891. Here, only a question of law
was involved based upon a proper interpretation of the statute. (b) The
second type of case not covered by the Ju Toy doctrine concerns the expulsion
iather than the exclusion of an alleged alien.' 99 In an expulsion case, when
the issue of citizenship is raised, the person is entitled to a judicial trial of
the issue.200 In the Ng Fung Ho case the Court said:
"Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if the
person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of
the essential jurisdictional fact .... If the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor may not be tested in the courts by means of the writ of habeas
corpus where the prisoner claims citizenship, and makes a showing
that his claim is not frivolous, then, obviously, deportation of a resident
may follow upon a purely executive order, whatever his race or place of
birth.... To deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives
him of liberty.... Against the danger of such deprivation without the
sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the 5th Amendment affords
protection in its guaranty of due process of law."
Although the courts have reiterated that the proceedings to expel are not
strictly criminal, nevertheless, in its essential elements the exclusion process
1

2This holding was forecast in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904)
and has been followed in later exclusion cases. Tang Tung v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673
(1912) ; Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352 (1927). For a defense of the Ju
Toy case see T. R. Powell, Judicial Review of Adninistrative Proceedings (1909) 22

HARV.L. REV. 360; for an adverse criticism see FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER
PERSONS AND PROPERTY pp. 292-293. Three dissenting judges in the Ju Toy case
characterized the doctrine of the majority as "appalling."
'2Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1 (1903).
"'This distinction was first recognized in Moy Suey v. United States, 147 Fed. 697
(C. C. A. 7th 1906).
"Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S.276 (1922).
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partakes largely of the nature of criminal justice. Exclusion has been characterized as "quasi criminal" because of the nature of the charges made,
the facts which must be proved, and the issues which must be -decided and,
more especially, in its effect upon the interests of the persons against whom
it is brought 2 0
The case of United States ex rel. Tisi v'. Tod 2°1 illustrates the principle
that although the existence of a fact may be "essential" to the authority to
deport, such "essential" fact is not necessarily "jurisdictional." Tisi, an
alien, was arrested in deportation proceedings. The reason specified for
his arrest was knowingly having in his possession, for the purpose of distribution, printed matter which advocated the overthrow of the government of
the United States by force. The procedure prescribed by the rules of the
department was, followed, and no abuse of discretion was shown. The Court
held that:
"Under these circumstances mere error, even if it consists in finding an
essential fact without adequate supporting evidence, is not a denial of
due process of law ....

What Tisi urges is that there was n9 evidence to

sustain the finding that he knew the seditious character of the printed
matter. Such knowledge is not, like alienage, a jurisdictional fact. But
it is an essential of the authority to deport."
In the case of Pearson v. TVilliams, 20 2 the Court recognized that the decision
of an immigration board was not "res judicata in a technical sense." Although the first decision of the board of inquiry was unanimous in permitting the immigrant to land, a second hearing, within the three-year period
provided by the statute, reversed the first finding and ordered his deportation.
The Court in permitting this second finding to stand as final, said:
"The board is an instrument of the executive power, not a court.
The decisions necessarily are made in a summary way in order to reach
the 'prompt determination' declared by section 25 to be an object ...
Decisions of a similar type long have been recognized as decisions of
the executive department, and cannot constitute res judicata in a technical sense."
Post Office Cases
The national government has managed to .make the seemingly unimportant and innocent grant of authority to establish "post offices and post
roads" serve as the constitutional peg upon which to hang a very sub0'VAN

VLEcK,

ADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROL OF ALIENS

(1932)

p. 224;

REpORT OF

MINORITY OF COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, H. R. REP. No. 10078, 70th Cong. 1st Sess.
H. R. 484, p. 8. It has been suggested that perhaps the case of Quon Quon Poy v.
Johnson, 273 U. S. 352 (1927) may be used as a basis for a third classification, i.e.,
exclusion in a case wherein the person "had never resided in the United States."
Perhaps 'a distinction may be built up later on the basis of these quoted words to
allow a judicial hearing in cases where prior residence has been established. See VAN
VLECIC, supra p. 191.
--a264 U. S. 131 (1924).
"-202 U. S. 281 (1906).
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stantial federal police power. 20 3 In establishing a postal system, Congress
must of necessity determine what is to be regarded as mail matter and what
is not. "In establishing such a system, Congress may restrict its use to letters
and deny it to periodicals; it may include periodicals and exclude books; it
may admit books to the mails and refuse to admit merchandise; or it may
include all of these and fail to embrace within its regulations telegrams or
large parcels of merchandise."'2 0 4 Congress has seen fit to bar from the
mails obscene books, papers, pictures, 20 5 packages or letters which have
libellous or indecent matter on their wrappers or envelopes, 20 6 letters or
packages containing lotteries or gift enterprises and schemes,20 7 packages or
writings which are part of a scheme to defraud, 208 and letters or writings
advocating treason.20 9 The courts have held that the determination of what
is mailable under the statutes is within the executive branch of the government.

210

The reasons for the power-renouncing attitude on the part of the courts
in favor of the administrative officers in this field are outlined in the cases
now to be considered. (1) In Public Clearing House v. Coyne,211 the Couri
stresses governmental necessity as a reason for administrative finality. "If
the ordinary daily transactions of the departments which involve an interference with private rights were required to be submitted to the courts before
action was finally taken, the result would entail practically a suspension of
some of the most important functions of government." (2) Congress has a
proprietary interest in the postal system which it does not have in interstate
commerce. Since Congress has created the postal system and is the
source of all postal privileges, the exercise of the power to deny those privileges
and to confer final determination on executive officials with reference thereto
is broader than in the field of interstate commerce. The Court was apparently
influenced by this in the leading case of Ex Parte Jackson212 when it said:

"But we do not think that Congress possesses the power' to prevent
the transportation in other ways as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails."
In two District court cases the inference seems to be that since the government is the proprietor, the use of the mail service by the individual is a privi'Cushman, National Police Power inder the Postal Clause of the Constitution
(1920) 4 MINN. L. R. 402.
'Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1903).
"3U. S. CODE TITLE 18 § 334.
2Ibid § 355.
nIbid § 336.
=Ibid § 338.
=Ibid § 344.
reMissouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1904).
'194 U. S. 497 (1904).
-'96 U. S. 727, 735 (1877).
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lege rather than a constitutional right.213 (3) The courts have held that there
is a strong presumption in favor of the legality of the actions of the Postmaster General, and his action "will be upset only when it is tainted with
fraud, absolutely without authority of law, clearly outside the statute, or
perhaps clearly, palpably and obviously wrong." 214 (4) In the leading case of
Bates & Guild Company v. Payne, 15 the Court refused to go behind the
ruling of the Postmaster General in a matter which apparently involved a
question of law-the interpretation of a statutory term. The plaintiff in
error insisted that a monthly musical publication, each issue of which was
complete in itself and treated of the works of a particular master musician,
was a "periodical publication" and entitled to the statutory rate for such
publications. The Postmaster General rejected this contention and the
Court in refusing to review the administrative decision said:
"Although a comparison of the exhibit with the statute may raise
only a question of law, the action of the Postmaster General may have
been, to a certain extent guided by extraneous information obtained by
him, so that the question involved would not be found merely a question
of law, but a mixed question of law and fact."
By way of comparison, consider the case of Houghton v. Payne.216 Here
the Court overruled an administrative construction of the term "periodical
publications" which had been followed by Postmaster Generals for sixteen
years and which permitted books, complete in themselves because published at stated intervals, to take advantage of the second class mailing rates.
The Court declared:
"A custom of the Department, however long continued by successive
officers, must yield to the positive language of the statute. Contemporary
construction is a rule of interpretation, but it is not an absolute one.
It does not preclude an inquiry by the courts as to the original correctness of the construction."
(5) In American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnlulty, 21 7 a limitation
was placed on administrative finality. The Court held that the Postmaster
General was not justified in prohibiting the delivery of letters to a corporation,
which assumed to heal disease through the influence of the mind, under
m
" People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 140 Fed. 1, 5 (C. C. E. D. Mo. (1905);
Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1904); See Cushman,
supra note 203 p. 423; United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 164 Fed. 215
(C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908), ree'd on other grounds in 213 U. S.366 (1909). For the distinction between "privilege" and "right," see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE L. J. 16. Cf. Corwin, Congress's
Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18 CORNELL L. Q. 477. See Lindsay Rogers,
The Postal Power of Congress JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL SCINCE

Series XXXIV, No. 2.

='Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. 472 (C. C. Ky. 1897).
194 U. S.106 (1904).
=O194 U. S. 106 (1904).

=7187 U. S.94 (1902).
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provision of the statute which authorized the detention of letters directed
to any person obtaining money through the mails by false pretenses. The
Court declared:
"The effectiveness of such treatment is a mere matter of opinion and
the statute is intended to cover only actual cases of fraud ....

There is

no exact standard of absolute truth by which to prove the assertion false
and a fraud. The Postmaster General's order being the result of a mistaken view of the law, i.e., a legal error, does not bind the courts."
In Leach v. Carlisle,218 the plaintiff in error contended that the question decided by the Postmaster General was that the substance which he was selling
did not produce the results claimed for it, that this in the record was a matter
of opinion as to which there was a conflict of evidence, and that, therefore,
the case was within the scope of the McAnnulty doctrine. The Court overruled this contention by holding that:
"The question really decided was not that the substance which appellant
was selling was entirely worthless as a medicine, as to which there was
some conflict in the evidence, but that it was so far from being the
panacea which he was advertising it through the mails to be, that by so
advertising it he was perpetrating a fraud on the public. This was a
question of fact which the statute committed to the decision of the Postmaster General and the settled rule of law is that the conclusion of a
head of an executive department on such a question when committed to
him by law will not be reviewed by the courts where it is fairly arrived
at and has substantial evidence to support it, so that it cannot justly
be said to be palpably wrong and therefore arbitrary."
(6) In connection with the revoking of second class mailing privileges and
the issuance of fraud orders (without a statutory provision for notice and
hearing) by the Postmaster General, a potential danger inheres in the administrative action because of its scope. A fraud order when issued necessarily prevents the delivery of all mail to the defrauder. 219 The Fourth
Amendment prohibits the opening of first class mail without a search warrant,220 and Congress has never authorized a search warrant for the search
of first class mail which has been seized. In United States ex rel. Milwaukee
Social Democratic PublishingCompany v. Burleson,221 the Court held that the
Postmaster General's revocation of the second class mailing privilege to a newspaper "would not be disturbed by the courts unless they are clearly of the
opinion that his conclusion is wrong." As to the scope of the revoking power,
the Court said that it was not limited "merely as to a single issue of such
paper" containing objectionable matter, but that it would continue in effect
"until a proper application and showing shall be made for a renewal of such
m258 U. S. 138 (1921).
'Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1903).
22Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1877).
='255 U. S. 407 (1931).
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privilege." The dissent in the Milwaukee case characterized the Postmaster
General under such a set-up as "the universal censor of publications . .. in
222
view of the practical finality of his decisions." Professor Ernst Freund
has pointed out that "the political power thus recognized is all the more
remarkable in that it is not explicitly given but rests upon a controverted
construction of the statute." If future Postmaster Generals are to find encouragements in certain broad judicial dicta to the effect that "the legislative body in establishing a postal service may annex such conditions as it
chooses" 22mand that "in respect to the mails, the United States is certainly
not a common carrier,"2 24 then, in the absence of Congressional intervention,
we may expect a dangerous exercise of administrative power. 22
(7) A fraud order case, Degge v. Hitchcock,22 6 is one of the best illustrations of the extent to which judicial review of administrative action may be
conditioned by the form of action chosen by the plaintiff. Here an attempt was
made by writ of certiorari to review a ruling of the Postmaster General who
had issued a fraud order. The Court in a unanimous decision stated that
"this case is the first instance (1913) in which a federal court has been asked
to issue a writ of certiorari to review a ruling by an executive officer of
the United States." The Court, in refusing to review the administrative
finding by certiorari, said:
"It is true that the Postmaster General gave notice and a hearing to
the persons specially to be affected by the order, and that in making his
ruling he may be said to have acted in a quasi judicial capacity. But the
statute was passed primarily for the benefit of the public at large, and
the order was for them and their protection. That fact gave an administrative quality to the hearing and to the order, and was sufficient to
prevent it from being subject to review by writ of certiorari. The Postmaster General could not exercise judicial functions, and in making the
decision he was not an officer presiding over a tribunal where his ruling
was final unless reversed. Not being a judgment, it was not subject
to appeal, writ of error, or certiorari. Not being a judgment, in the
sense of a final adjudication, the plaintiffs in error were not concluded
by his decision, for had there been an arbitrary exercise of statutory
power, or a ruling in excess of the jurisdiction conferred, they had the
right to apply for and obtain appropriate relief in a court of equity.
American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94.
"The fact that there was this remedy is itself sufficient to take the
case out of the principle on which, at common law, right to the writ was
founded. For there it issued to officers and tribunals only because there
was no other method of preventing injustice. Besides, if the commonlaw writ, with all of its incidents, could be construed to apply to administrative and quasi judicial rulings, it could, with a greater show of
IADMINISTRATIV
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY p. 442.
='Public Hearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 506 (1903).
z--Leach v. Carlisle, 245 Fed. 103, (C. C. A. 7th 1910).
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authority, issue to remove a record before decision, and so prevent a ruling
in any case where it was claimed there was no jurisdiction to act. This
would overturn the principle that, as long as the proceedings are in
fieri, the courts will not interfere with the hearing and disposition of
matters before the Departments. Plested v. Abbey, 228 U. S. 42, 51."
The Court admitted that there were many state precedents for the use
of the writ of certiorari attempted here under state statutes which had enlarged the scope of the writ at common law, but concluded "that none of
these decisions are in point in a federal jurisdiction where no such statute
has been passed." It is this diversity in statutory extensions of these extraordinary writs in the various jurisdictions which makes impractical a general discussion of the manner in which the form of action conditions the
judicial review of administrative determinations.
Tax Cases
The dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes that "the power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits"' 227 does not describe accurately the

role of the courts in tax cases. Frank J. Goodnow comes nearer the truth
when he says:
"The individual is by the American law of taxation quite commonly subjected to the arbitrary discretion of the tax authorities, so far as concerns questions of assessment and valuation; and because of the inadequacy of the judicial remedies available finds it difficult-if not
impossible-in many cases, to secuie a judicial review even on questions of law. This is particularly true of the smaller taxpayers. ' 228
The judiciary, in permitting broad and often final power to be exercised
by the taxing authorities has stressed the following considerations: (1) A
tax is a demand of sovereignty and essential to its very existence. "The
power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all of the
powers of government. .

.

. Given a purpose or object for which taxation

may be lawfully used, and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature
unlimited. ' 229 (2) In Springer v. United States230 the Court stressed the
notion that
"....

prompt payment of taxes is always important to the public welfare.

It may be vital to the existence of a government. The idea that every
taxpayer is entitled to the delays of litigation is unreason. If the laws
here in question involve any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for
Congress, or the people who make Congresses, to see that the evil was
corrected. The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government."
-'Dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S.218 at 223 (1927).
28(1916) XII REP. AmER. BAR Ass'N. 408 at 414.
2'Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 663 (U. S. 1874).

='102 U. S.586 (1880).

See also Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (U. S. 1870).
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(3) In Bartlett v. Kane,23 1 the Court denied any review of administrative
appraisement, even though the Court did not favor the administrative method
used. The necessity for the decision was justified in the following language:
"The interposition of the courts in the appraisement of importations would
involve the collection of the revenue in inextricable confusion and embarrassment." (4) Another reason for administratie finality was advanced in
Hilton v. Merritt.232 The Court said:
"If in every suit brought to recover duties paid under protest, the
jury were allowed to review the appraisement made by the customs'
officers, the result would be great uncertainty and inequality in the collection of duties on imports. It is quite possible that no two juries would
agree upon the value of different invoices of the same goods."
(5) It should be noted that the Bartlett and Hilton cases involved the power
of final valuation by customs officers. However, on the question of classification, the courts formerly went behind the administrative determination.=
However, by the Act of 1909,234 Congress created a special Court of Customs
Appeals and transferred to it the appellate jurisdiction previously exercised
by the regular federal courts over the board of general appraisers. Its decisions were at first made absolutely final, but by the Act of 191423' it has
been made possible for the Supreme Court in its discretionary use of certiorari to review decisions which it regards as of sufficient importance. Congress has thus created a specialized mechanism whereby the details of tariff
administration have been put beyond the reach of the ordinary courts with
opportunity reserved for the protection of ultimate substantive rights by the
Supreme Court of the United States.23 6 (6) A somewhat similar development
is taking place in the administration of the internal revenue and income tax
laws.23 7 Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court in Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 233 stressed some of the reasons for
administrative finality in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
(a) In the first place, he pointed out, the subject matter is highly technical and
involves many types of skill other than legal. Engineers, accountants, valu'16 Howard 263 (U. S. 1853). See T. R. Powell, Conclusiveness of Administrative
Determinationsin the Federal Government (1907) 1 Am. PoL. ScI. REv. 583.
=l10 U. S.97 (1884).
'In Holmes v. Collector, 1 Wall. 486 (U. S. 1863) the Court determined whether
almonds were dried fruit; in Toplitz v. Heden, 146 U. S.252 (1892) whether "Scotch
bonnets" were hats or caps; in Son v. Magone, 159 U. S. 417 (1894) whether dried
beans were seeds or vegetables; in Bogle v. Magone, 152 U. S. 623 (1893) whether
anchovy and bloater paste were a "sauce." See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 89 (1919).
'Act of Aug. 5, 1909 c. 6, 36 STAT. 100.
'Act of Aug. 22, 1914 c. 267, 38 STAT. 708.
'DICKINSON, supra note 225, p. 276; LEvErT, THROUGH THE CUSTOMS MAZE (1923).
'Roswell Magill, The Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (1930) 30 COL. L.REv. 147; Chas. D. Hamel, The United States Board of Tax
Appeals (1924) 10 BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL TAX Ass'N. 41-51.
8277 U. S. 551 (1927).
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ation experts, and statisticians are essential to the proper functioning of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (b) Therefore, the conclusions reached would
rest largely upon considerations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof.
The Bureau can and does consider facts which would be difficult or impossible
to prove under common law rules of evidence, but which are, nevertheless,
highly material to the cases. (c) Very often the Treasury's determination in a
particular case is dependent upon or greatly aided by the facts found in a
whole series of similar cases. (d) The federal courts have no technical staff,
nor have they much opportunity of obtaining detailed technical information
except as it may be laboriously presented on the witness stand in the particular
case. (7) Because of the necessity of prompt assessment and collection of
taxes, the courts have taken a very liberal view of due process of law in the tax
cases, especially as it relates to notice, hearing, and the right of judicial
review.
The following principles have received general recognition by the courts.
Personal notice relating to the assessment of taxes is not essential to due
process of law.2839 However, if the statute requires personal notice, no other
form will suffice; and proof of such notice is a jurisdictional fact. 240 Provisions
for notice and hearing in a statute are to be regarded as mandatory. 241 To
constitute due process, notice is not required at every stage. 242 All that is
necessary lis that an opportunity for a hearing must be given at some stage
before the liability for the tax becomes final. 243 This is true whether back or
current taxes are involved. 24 However, due process does not necessarily require a judicial hearing. 245 If the tax statute provides for no notice whatsoever, the law will be unconstitutional; but the tax itself cannot be attacked
if notice in fact was given.2 4 6 Notice by publication, when authorized by
law, is sufficient. 247 Notice by statute, when the statute itself fixes the time and
place for the meeting of assessors or the Board of Equalization, is sufficient
notice and opportunity for a hearing to satisfy the requirements of due
process of law.248 A hearing to be valid demands that he who is entitled to it
shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief, and,
if need be, by proof, however informal. It is not necessary that there be an
opportunity to submit in writing all objections. 249 Where a taxpayer has an
opportunity to be heard, the due process clause is not violated because the
2'Merchant's Bank v. Pa., 167 U. S. 461 (1896).
mScott
v. Brackett, 89 Ind. 413 (1833).
4

2 Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177 (1888).

"Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196 (1899).
'Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23 (1914).
'Winona Land Co. v. Minn., 159 U. S. 527 (1895).
'State v. Sponagle, 45 W. Va. 415 (1899).
',Security Trust C6. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1905).
"Wright v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371 (1900).
'Merchants Bank v. Pa., 167 U. S. 461 (1896).
"Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1907).
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taxpayer has no right to appeal from the decision. 250 One hearing is sufficient
to constitute due process.

251

(8) Congress, in order to facilitate the collection of taxes and to prevent
ruinous delay by litigation, enacted Section 3224252 which provides that "no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court." A literal interpretation of this Code provision enacted sixty years ago would prohibit any interference by an equity
court in the taxing process. However, the federal judiciary by interpretation
has considerably restricted the scope of the Congressional declaration. Two
exceptions have been created. (a) Section 3224 has been held not to apply in
the case of "special and extraordinary facts and circumstances." The leading
case is Miller v. Nut Margarine Company.253 The plaintiff here began the
manufacture and sale of a product, which was not taxable under the Oleomargarine Act, after a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
its product was not taxable and after court determination that similar products
were not taxable. The Commissioner changed his ruling after the plaintiff
had been manufacturing the product for more than a year and attempted to
levy a 10 cents per pound tax, whereas the plaintiff's profit was only 3 cents
per pound. The Commissioner made no attempt to assess the tax on
manufacturers of similar products. In a suit to enjoin the collection of the
tax, the Court said:
"His [the Commissioner's] determination that respondent's product
was oleomargarine and taxable under the Act was erroneous and, in view
of his earlier interpretations and the Court decision which had become
final, must be held arbitrary and capricious. It was without force....
The article is not covered by ,the Act. A valid oleomargarine tax could
by no legal possibility have been assessed against respondent, and therefore the reasons underlying section 3224 apply, if at all; with little force.
* * * Such discrimination conflicts with the principle underlying the
constitutional provision directing that excises laid by Congress shall be
uniform throughout the United States. It requires no elaboration of the
facts found to show that the enforcement of the Act against respondent
would be arbitrary and oppressive, would destroy its business, ruin it
financially and inflict loss for which it would have no remedy at law.
It is clear that, by reason of the special and254extraordinaryfacts and circumstances, section 3224 does not apply."
(b) The second exception by which section 3224 has been held to be inapv. Receveur, Treas., 71 Fed. 455 (C. C. A. 7th'1896).
'Michigan Central R. R. v. Powell, 201 U. S. 373 (1905).
IREv. STAT. 1875 § 3224, 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1928). The recent filing of over 1600
suits demanding injunctions in apparent contravention of the statute only emphasizes
the confusion which has marked its checkered career. (1935) 3 U. S. LAw WEEx 45; note
(1935) 49 Hv. L. REv. 109.
=284 U. S. 498 (1931).
'See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S.44 (1921). Compare Bailey v. George, 259 U. S.
16 (1921) ; Dodge v. Osborne, 240 U. S. 118 (1915) ; Snider v. Mark, 109 U. S. 189
"McLeod

(1883).
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plicable by the courts relates to a case where the "tax" is held to be in fact a
"penalty." Regal Drug Company v. Wardel125 5 and Lipke v. Lederer26 held
that the "tax" imposed by Section 35 of the National Prohibition Act was in
fact a "penalty" in the nature of a punishment for a criminal offense. In the
Regal case, the collector had actually seized possession of the plaintiff's
store and was proceeding to sell his stock of goods; and in the Lipke case, the
collector had stated that he was about to levy a warrant of distress. In both
cases, the Court held that an injunction against the collection of the tax was
absolutely necessary to prevent irreparable injury by the utter destruction
of the plaintiffs' businesses.
(9) In the field of the so-called general property tax, which supplies so large
a part of the revenue of our state and local governments, it is a matter of
common knowledge that the taxing authorities violate the state constitutional
and statutory requirements of "uniformity" of taxation and assessment at
"the actual value" of all property liable to taxation. The Supreme Court of
the United States has admitted that the rule of uniform assessment "is habitually disregarded," 7 yet judicial relief is only rarely obtainable.2 58 Value
is a matter of opinion, and there is no judicial relief against error of judgment . 5 9 However, if fraud 26° or intentional and wilful overvaluation, 61
which constitutes constructive fraud, is present, a court of equity will give
relief.
There are two principal types of cases involving unequal assessment in the
general property tax field. One is where certain real property is assessed in a
non-uniform manner as compared with other real property; the other is
where real and personal property are not assessed uniformly. Two illustrative
cases will indicate the dilemma confronting the courts if they attempt to
give relief. Taylor v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad262 involved an unequal treatment of real property by the taxing authorities of the State of
Tennessee. The state constitution directed that taxes should be "equal and
uniform" and that "no one species of property should be taxed higher than
any other of the same value." Further, a state statute provided that all property should be assessed at its "full value." All real estate, other than railway
property, was habitually assessed at 75% of its real value, while railroad
property was assessed at 100%. This arrangement required the railroads
of the state to bear one-sixth, rather then one-eighth, of the whole state
2 260 U. S. 386 (1922).
6259 U. S. 557 (1922).
'Cummings v. National Bank, 191 U. S. 163 (1879).
'JUDsoN, TAXATION § 467.
'People- v. Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 Ill. 522 (1910).
'Pacific Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Dalton, 119 Cal. 604 (1898).
"'Cincinnati Southern Railway v. Guenther, 19 Fed. 395 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1884);
COOLEY, TAXATION

§

1144.

'88 Fed. 350 (C.'C. A. 7th 1898).-
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tax burden. The court, in refusing to raise the assessments of all property
to meet the statutory requirements said:
"The court is placed in a dilemma from which it can only escape by
taking that path which, while it involves a nominal departure from the
letter of the law, does injury to no one and secures that uniformity
which was the sole end of the constitution ...The same dilemma has
been presented
to other courts. They have not always taken the same
2 3
horn." 6

In Mercantile National Bank v. Mayor,264 personal property was assessed
at its full value and real estate was assessed at not more than 60%o of its real
value. The taxpayer claimed that personal property should be assessed in the
same manner as real property, and he, therefore, tendered 65%o of the tax
demanded on his personal property. The collector refused to accept anything less than the full tax, and the taxpayer brought suit to restrain the
collection of the excess over the amount tendered. The court said:
"A general statutory rule has been disregarded by the assessors in the
exercise, presumably, of an honest and reasonable judgment, as nothing
is charged to the contrary; but their action was impartial, and with
reference to the whole community .... It is a fact of common knowledge
and discussion that a disproportionate share of the public burdens is
thrown on certain kinds of property because they are visible and tangible, while others are of a nature to elude vigilance."
The effect of this decision is,"in the language of a critic, to declare
"... that the assessors may lawfully disobey the law; that in their discretion they may use a standard of valuition which the people of the
state 2 through
the legislature have expressly declared that they may not
65
use."

Professor John Dickinson has pointed out that this case is significant
"inthat it emphasizes inan extreme form the predisposition of the courts to
sustain the action of tax officials in every case." 266 Judge Cooley, the great
authority on taxation, after a review of a myriad of cases, concludes that
... many serious errors may be committed and many wrongs done
in the exercise of the power to tax, which the parties wronged must
submit to... The chief protection of the citizen must at last be sought
in the intelligence of public officers, and where these fail,267as too often
they do, the injury must frequently prove irreparable."
Police Power Cases
In this field "there is, if possible, an even greater variety and uncertainty
'See JUDSON, TAXATION § 472; Wagoner v. Loomis, 37 Ohio St. 571 (1881) ; Lowell
v. County Commissioners, 152 Mass. 372 (1890); Central Railway v. Assessors, 48
N. 3. L. 1 (1886).
-'172 N. Y. 35 (1902).
-'ABBOT, JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAW

p.

221.

11ADmINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMAcY OF LAW
-LAw OF TAXATION § 1610.

p. 274.
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in the decisions" 268 as to the respective spheres of administrative finality
and judicial review than in the other types of governmental power already
considered. (1) The courts are in hopeless confusion as to whether administrative determination of the existence of a nuisance shall be final and conclusive.
In this perplexing conflict between public welfare and private rights,269 the
problem is aggravated further by the fact that in addition to common law
nuisances, which have been recognized by a slow process of judicial decision,
we have legislative nuisances and attempts by 'the legislature to delegate
the nuisance creating and the nuisance determining power to administrative
officers. 27 0 Perhaps the weight of the more recent authority is in accord with
the view that no decision of an administrative official will be allowed to condude the owner upon a question of nuisance, 271 especially if the need for
haste and summary action is not compelling. 272 It is the general rule that the
legislature may delegate the abatement power to administrative officers, but
in those cases where abatement is had without a'previous determination
by due process of law that a nuisance in fact exists, the officer is held to act
at his peril. 273 However, it is usually a good defense if the officer acted in

good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing, even though mistakenly,
that a nuisance in fact existed. But it should be noted that this formula as
to whether the officer had reasonable ground for believing that his action
was justified sometimes enables the jury to take an extreme view, with the
result that the officer may be held liable in damages even when, to the ordinary
layman, there appear to have been facts furnishing adequate reason for the
officer to believe-that he was justified in taking the action. In Lowe v.
Conroy,274 an officer destroyed hides which were allegedly contaminated with
the hide of an anthrax-infected steer. The value of the hides and the meat
destroyed was $239. The steer's blood was examined by a doctor and a state
veterinarian, and both said that the steer was infected with anthrax. The
jury, however, found that the steer was not infected and held the officer to
be liable in damages. This case is also of interest in that it overruled the
"DIcKINSON,

ADMINiSTRATIVE JUSTICE AND

THE SUPREMACY OF LAW

p. 60.

'Goodnow, Sucmnary Abatement of Nuisances (1902) 2 COL. L. REv. 203.

'People v. Polinski, 73 N. Y. 65 (1878); Commonweilth v. Siston, 189 Mass. 246
(1905).
"
'7Trinity Church case, 145 N. Y. 32 (1895); Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497
(U. S.1871); Hutton v. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122 (1876) ; People ex rel. Copcutt v.
Board of Health, 140 N. Y. 1 (1893) ; See T. R. Powell, Administrative Exercise of
the Police Power (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 339. See, contra, Kennedy v. Board of
Health, 2 Pa. 366 (1845) ; Green v. Mayor, 6 Ga. 1 (1848) ; City of St. Louis v. Stern,
3 Mo. App. 48 (1876); Metropolitan Board v. Hesiter, 37 N. Y. 661 (1868); Van
Wormser v. Mayor, 15 Wend. 262 (N. Y. 1836)--earlier cases wherein the courts gave
administrative determinations a "judicial" finality.
m'Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883) ; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U. S.320 (1909) ; Brown v. Purdy, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 143 (1887) ; Beeks v. Kickinson County, 131 Iowa 244 (1906) ; Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N. J.L. 509 (1908).
=See Goodnow, supra note 269.
"'120 Wis. 151 (1904).
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doctrine of Fath v. Koeppe1275 which involved an action against a meat
inspector for the destruction of fish which the plaintiff claimed were not in
fact unwholesome. In the Koeppel case the court said that the meat inspector
was performing a judicial function.
"The officer exercising such a power is within the protection of the
principle that a judicial officer is not responsible in an action for damages
to any one for any judgment he may render, however erroneously,
negligently, ignorantly, corruptly, or maliciously
he may act in render275
ing it, if the act was within his jurisdiction." 1
(2) The famous case of Commonwealth v. Sisson 27 6 illustrates how an administrative agency may in the same case make and apply a rule to a concrete
situation. The Fish and Game Commissioners, without a hearing, directed
an order to the defendants who operated a saw mill to cease discharging
sawdust into a stream and to erect a blower to dispose of the sawdust, in
order to protect the fish in the Konkapot River. The court held that the
order, although addressed to but one individual, was legislative in character
and, therefore, no hearing was necessary. The court said:
"We do not agree that, because it is not a general regulation, it is a
judicial action... The Board is no more required to act on sworn evidence
than is the legislature itself, and no more than ffie legislature itself is
it bound to act only after a hearing, or to give a hearing to the plaintiff
when he asks for one; and its action is final, as is the action of the legislature in enacting a statute. And being legislative, it is plain that the
questions of fact passed upon by the commissioners in adopting the provisions enacted by them cannot be tried over by the court. . . The
practical result is that the defendants are forbidden to conduct their
sawmill as they had conducted it for thirty years by a board who have
not heard evidence and have refused the defendants a hearing; that the
action of the board is final, and that no compensation is due them. This
result may seem strange. But it is no less strange than the practical
results in cases which are decided law."
It has been pointed out that "this strained interpretation struck down at
one blow not merely the right to judicial review of the administrative finding,
but the very possibility of review; for in the absence of a hearing there cannot
277
well be any finding, properly so called."
(3) The license is a common mechanism in the field of police power to regulate the practice of technical occupations. In the granting of such licenses, expert knowledge is often required and the courts are inclined to permit the
administrative officers to exercise a final determination of questions of fact
or mixed questions of law and fact. A typical illustration is Granville v..
Gregary.278 A state board of medical examiners had refused a license to an
-",72 Wis. 289 (1888).

7'189 Mass. 246 (1905).

'DICKINSON,
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'83 Mo. 123 (1884).
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applicant on the ground that the institution from which he had been graduated
was not a medical college in good standing. The applicant applied to the
courts to compel the board by mandamus to issue the license. The writ was
denied. The court declared that if it assume revisory powers in this case
"it would be palpably usurping functions conferred exclusively by law upon
others." The judicial branch of the government made it clear that it did
not relish the task of "wandering amid the mazes of therapeutics or boggling
at the mysteries of the pharmacopoeia. '279 At time, the rationale of the
decision in this type of case seems to be conditioned in part by the form of
action used by the plaintiff,280 and in part by the court's theory as to the
281
nature of a license.
(4) In the administration of state Workmen's Compensation Acts, administrative boards have been created for the purpose of adjudicating the rights
of litigants under the Acts. Although the statute is usually predicated on the
jurisdictional fact theory, the courts generally refuse to determine for themselves the existence of the "jurisdictional fact," but rather limit themselves
to inquiring whether there was substantial evidence upon which the board
could reasonably have found that the fact existed. A typical illustration of
2 2
this attitude is expressed in Milwaukee Coke Co. v. Industrial Commission
wherein the court declared that
"....

there is evidence in the case which supports the findings of fact

made by the Commission, hence it cannot be said that the board acted
without or in excess of its powers, even though this court, if trying
the fact, might reach a different conclusion. If there was substantial
credible evidence supporting the findings of the Commission, the courts
cannot interfere."
(5) The practical application of the jurisdictional fact theory is conditioned
by means of a corollary to the separation of powers doctrine which often
restricts or completely denies the availability of certain forms of action
when.directed agaifist high ranking officers. The necessary effect of this
doctrine makes for administrative finality. The judiciary will not interfere
with executive officers in the performance of duties which are discretionary
-'The same principle was applied in People v. Scott, 86 Hun. 174 (N. Y. 1894) (plumbing license) ; State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366 (1904) (barber license) ; Illinois State Board
of tmHealth v. People, 102 Il. App. 614 (1902) (medical license).
See State Board v. White, 84 Ky. 626 (1887); State v. Adcock, 206 Mo. 505
(1907) ; State v. Prendegast, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 401 (1906).
r'The older view of license as announced in Basset v. Godschall, 3 Wilson 121 (1770)
was that an applicant has no right to a license unless the authorities grant him one,
and he is, therefore, deprived of no right by their refusal. This theory is becoming less
tenable as more and more occupations are brought under licensing provisions, and the
possibilities of making a living in unlicensed occupations are becoming proportionately
narrower.
'160 Wis. 247 (1915). See also Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686
(1915); compare Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327 at 359 (1911). See also Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
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in their nature, 28 3 and, in a majority of jurisdictions, it has been held that
the Governor is immune from judicial control iri
the discharge of both discretionary and ministerial duties..2 8 4 Although this immunity is limited in
theory by the doctrine that it is applicable only to acts within the scope of
executive authority,2 85 in practice it is often complete because of the vague
contours of the concept of "political" duties and of "discretionary" power.
Seventeen of our state courts have held that mandamus will not issue to the
Governor to compel him to perform even a "ministerial" act.286 In Kendall v.
Stokes, 281 the Court,- in referring to the Postmaster General, said:
"Sometimes erroneous constructions of law may lead to a final rejection
of a claim in cases wherein it ought to be allowed. But a public officer
is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to
be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which
it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even though an
individual may suffer by his mistake. A contrary principle would, indeed,
be pregnant with the greatest mischiefs."
(6) Some courts have been influenced to assume a power-renouncing attitude in the review of administrative action by emphasizing the specialized
training and experience of the personnel of many of these new administrative
agencies. An extreme illustration is the case of Steener v. Great Northern
Railway 288 involving a rate determination by the Minnesota Railroad and
Warehouse Commission. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, after paying a
tribute to the learning and ability of this commission of experts declared in
deep humility:
"How is a judge, who is not supposed to have any of this special learning or experience, and could not take judicial notice of it if he had it, to
review the decisions of commissioners, who should have it and should
act upon it. It seems to us that such a judge is not fit to act in such a
matter. It is not a case of the blind leading the blind, but of one who has
always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and hear better than
one who has always had his eyesight and hearing, and has always used
them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to the
matter in question. Before a judge can act intelligently in such a matter,
he must have an amount of this special knowledge and experience which
it will take him years to acquire. It is not sufficient that he take his first
'Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Peters 497 (U. S. 1840) ; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347
(U. S. 1869); Cox v. United States, 9 Wall. 298 (U. S. 1870); Litchfield v. Richards,
9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1870).
2'"12 R.

C. L. 1008.

Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157 (1913). Quo warranto may be an effective
remedy.
'H. Kumm, Mandamus to the Governor (1924) 9 MIxx. L. Rav. 21. Twelve states
have held in the affirmative.
'3 Howard 87 (U. S. 1845) ; see Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1895).
'72 N. W. 713 (Minn. 1897).
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lessons from the partisan and perhaps perjured, experts, or so-called
experts, produced by the p~arties at the trial."
The court, by emphasizing- "the technical learning, knowledge and information" of the commission not only gave an extended breadth and vitality to
the doctrine that "the court must resolve every reasonable doubt in favor
of the commission's finding," but also, in effect, reduced to its nadir the
possibility of utilizing the jurisdictional fact theory.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have attempted in this article to analyze one of the most
perplexing doctrines in the field of administrative law. I have traced (a) the
historical development of the clash between the forces of judicial and administrative supremacy and (b) have outlined several doctrines (other than the
jurisdictional fact theory) that have had the ultimate effect of contributing
to administrative autonomy, although in some instances such was not their
original purpose. (c) I have traced the historical development of the jurisdictional fact theory; and (d) I have attempted to show its relation to the doctrines
of ultra vires and (e) liability of public officers. (f) In order that the reader, by
way of background, may have a clear picture of the nature and effect of the
modern jurisdictional fact theory as applied in an actual legal setting, I have
presented a critique of the case of Crowell v. Benson. (g) I have attempted to
distinguish the problem of jurisdiction as applied to courts as contrasted with
administrative bodies and (h) to distinguish between "jurisdictional" and other
facts. (i) There has been a discussion of legislative efforts to immunize administrative orders against judicial review in England and in America and (j)
administrative attempts to immunize administrative bodies from judicial
review. Finally, I have considered three factors which condition the exercise
of the jurisdictional fact theory and whose presence, either singly or in
combination, will at least warrant a prediction as to the general judicial trend.
Those factors are: (1) the type of governmental power involved; (2) the
form of action employed by the plaintiff; and (3) the type of administrative
finding, whether summary, after hearing with procedural safeguards, or
complicated investigations based upon expert determinations.

